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Abstract 
I argue that fitting envy plays a special role in safeguarding our happiness and flourishing. After 
presenting my theory of envy and its fittingness conditions, I contrast Kant’s view that envy is 
always unfitting with D’Arms and Jacobson’s defense of fitting envy as an evolutionarily-shaped 
response to a deep and wide human concern, that is, relative positioning. However, D’Arms and 
Jacobson don’t go far enough. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, distinguishing 
between an epistemic claim, according to which we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what 
position we occupy in a continuum of goodness, and thus to form judgments of goodness, and a 
metaphysical one, according to which much human goodness depends on implicit or explicit 
rankings and positionality. Second, I argue that fitting envy is not only intrinsically valuable qua 
fitting response to authentic goodness, but can be epistemically, morally and prudentially valuable.  
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0. Introduction1 
Thick and abundant hair; an unblemished skin; physical strength; being quick-witted; a fast sport car; 
a lush garden; a doting and supportive partner; well-behaved and academically successful children; a 
reputation on social media; a remunerative job. 
 
1 For incisive and constructive criticism on a previous version of this paper I’m grateful to all the participants to “Fit 
Fest”, and in particular to Rachel Achs, Selim Berker, Louise Hanson, Tom Hurka, Stephanie Leary, Brian McElwee, 
Oded Na’aman, Mauro Rossi, Philip Stratton-Lake, and Christine Tappolet. I’m also thankful to Stephen Campbell and 
Oded Na’aman for in-depth conversations and precious advice about how to reframe my argument; to Justin D’Arms 
for clarifications about his and Daniel Jacobson’s view; to Tyler Doggett for helpful feedback on a prior version of this 
paper (cf. “Conclusion” in Protasi 2021), and Kariah Phillips for sharing her professional counseling insights on this 
topic. Finally, thanks to Christopher Howard and Richard Rowland for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for 
their encouraging and detailed feedback on my contribution. 
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 These are only a few of the things we envy. A comprehensive list would be extremely long, 
perhaps infinite. For something to be an object of envy, the envier has to think of it as both valuable 
and as something they lack: we envy others for things that we care about but that we don’t have. 
There are all sorts of objects that fit such a subjective description. Thus, it seems that, in principle, 
anything could be envied.  
But not everything is objectively worthy of envy. In fact, one may argue that nothing is truly 
enviable, or, in other words, that envy is never an apt response to the perceived lack of a good. 
 The idea that envy is systematically misguided or necessarily inappropriate is fairly popular in 
the history of ideas, both within and without academia, and takes various forms. In popular sayings, 
envy is presented as irrational (“envy slayeth the silly ones”), maliciously counterproductive (“envy 
spoils the good it covets”), self-defeating even, since it “slays itself by its own arrows” and “shoots 
at others, but hits itself.” 
 In this paper I focus on a particular version of this critique: the idea that envy is never 
fitting. Envy’s complex nature makes the analysis of its fittingness conditions complicated, but here 
I’m particularly interested in one component: the envied object. If the envied object is never 
authentically good, then envy is necessarily unfitting. I’ll clarify and expand on this concept 
momentarily, but let me first emphasize that it differs from another kind of popular critique: the idea 
that envy is always immoral and imprudent. Many people think that envy proper always motivates 
the envier to act badly. The sayings above incorporate some of that critique: envy “shoots at others” 
and “spoils the good”.  
  The critique I intend to challenge precedes worries about envy’s alleged moral or prudential 
badness, and is, rather, about envy’s core concern: relative positioning. The gist of such critique is that 
authentic goodness doesn’t depend on any sort of comparison. This is a popular view in everyday 
conversations about envy (“you should focus on what you have, not what others have!”), but can 
also be found in the philosophical tradition. 
 I defend the opposite view: authentic goodness very often depends on some sort of 
comparison, and thus, not only can envy be fitting, but furthermore its core concern is systematically 
connected with our flourishing as humans.  
 Here is a preview of the paper. I start by presenting my original taxonomy of envy and 
showing how it expands our understanding of the many ways in which envy can be fitting or 
unfitting (section 1). Then, I introduce the position that envy is always unfitting insofar as it’s 
concerned with the inauthentic good of relative positioning, a position exemplified by Immanuel 
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Kant (section 2), and contrast it with Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s view, which is that envy 
can be fitting insofar as it is an evolutionarily-shaped response to a deep and wide human concern, 
viz., relative positioning (section 3). However, I argue that D’Arms and Jacobson don’t go far 
enough in their defense of fitting envy. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, by 
distinguishing between two claims: an epistemic one, according to which we use implicit or explicit 
comparison to know what position we occupy in this continuum of goodness, and thus to form 
judgments of goodness (section 4), and a metaphysical one, according to which much human 
goodness depends on implicit or explicit rankings and positionality (section 5). Second, I show that 
we can be a lot more sanguine about the role of envy in our ethical lives than D’Arms and Jacobson 
appear to be. They are hesitant to attribute a positive practical role to fitting envy and suggest 
instead that it might be appropriate to repress it. Against this view, I argue that fitting envy is not 
only intrinsically valuable qua fitting response to authentic goodness, but can be epistemically, 
morally and prudentially valuable (section 6). Fitting envy plays a crucial role in safeguarding our 
well-being and, in some varieties, even our flourishing as moral agents. 
 
1. The Multifarious Nature of Envy, and Its Fittingness Conditions 
In this section I provide a sketch of an account of envy I defend elsewhere (Protasi 2016, 2021), 
which is supported by extensive empirical evidence, and also foreshadowed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and 
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, among other philosophical works. 
Envy is usually understood as a three-place relation, involving the subject who feels the 
emotion (envier); the person toward whom the emotion is directed (envied); and the object that is 
envied (the good). It’s important to keep in mind the relational and comparative nature of envy (that it’s 
always targeted at and vis-à-vis another person) so as to distinguish it from a mere desire or wish to 
have something one doesn’t have (whereby there is no relation to another person) and from 
coveting something possessed by another (whereby the other person doesn’t constitute a standard of 
comparison, and which lacks the painful self-reflective element typical of envy).  
So, here is a more substantive definition that helps distinguish envy from similar attitudes: 
envy is an aversive response to a perceived inferiority or disadvantage vis-à-vis a similar other, with 
regard to a good that is relevant to the sense of identity of the envier.2 
 
2 I can’t address the many objections that usually arise when presenting such a definition to a philosophical audience; so 
many different elements whetting the appetite for an endless search for counterexamples! Plenty of scenarios can be 
concocted to show that this account doesn’t capture all possible cases of envy—some quite plausible! However, I talk of 
 4 
Let me unpack this definition by using a concrete example. Suppose I confess feeling envy 
for my sister’s unblemished skin. (That I don’t have a sister makes my confession a lot easier.) By 
confessing this envy, I thereby communicate to you that I’m feeling some sort of pain (my response 
is affectively aversive), which is brought about by the perception that someone whom I see as similar 
to me has a superior skin texture; my envy also tells you that I see my own skin as comparatively 
tarnished; finally, you can also infer that having unblemished skin, or perhaps more generally an 
unblemished exterior, is something that I care about, or, as some psychologists put it, a “self-
relevant” goal or domain (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007, 454-456). 
 As mentioned earlier, there’s robust empirical evidence supporting each component of this 
definition: social psychologists agree that any kind of envy is painful or at least unpleasant to feel; 
that we only feel it towards someone whom we perceive as similar to us in some respect, someone 
who’s in the same comparison class as we, and whom we perceive as being in a superior position of 
some sort; and, finally, that we envy people only for things that we perceive to be good under certain 
descriptions and that we see as relevant and important to us (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007; Smith 
and Kim 2007; Lange and Crusius 2015 provide detailed reviews).  
 Naturally, the empirical evidence concerning these conditions isn’t always nuanced. When it 
comes to similarity between the envied and the envier, for instance, psychologists usually refer to 
simple demographic factors like age and gender. But philosophers (Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Hume) 
also discuss this aspect of envy in their analyses, and include similarity based on kinship, 
spatiotemporal closeness, occupation, and caring about the same things. Sometimes we envy people 
with regard to general goods (happiness, health, luck in love), or specific but almost universally 
desired ones (such as a vaccine for COVID-19)—in these cases, the envied are similar to us qua 
fellow human beings, and the domain of self-relevance is very broad (most of us care about being 
happy and healthy). Even when similarity is broadly construed, however, envy is likely to be more 
intense if the envied other is similar to us in some respect, such as being “near […] in time and place 
and age and reputation” (Kennedy 2007, 145), as Aristotle remarks in the Rhetoric (Rhet. II.10).  
 In sum, the majority of those who have thought and written about envy, whether 
philosophers or psychologists, in ancient or contemporary times, agree on what this emotion is. The 
 
envy as a concrete culturally-specific (think: contemporary “Western” industrialized societies) emotional phenomenon 
that affects the average person. People vary in their emotional repertoire. When anthropologists say that envy is a 
universal emotion, that claim isn’t falsified by the fact that a few people never feel envy. Similarly, when psychologists 
talk about the factors that I’m about to explain, that is compatible with idiosyncratic experiences or the existence of 
cases that aren’t fully captured by these conditions.  
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disagreement begins when it comes to what it motivates us to do and whether it’s necessarily 
immoral. The traditional and popular understanding of envy is that of a malicious (thus immoral) 
emotion, which pushes the agent to bring down the envied and spoil the envied good. This notion, 
however, has come under severe empirical critique in the last fifteen years: many studies have shown 
the existence of a genuine kind of envy that is benign, insofar as it motivates to “level up”, to try and 
emulate the envied or to attain what the envied has (van de Ven 2016). The consensus is that, in 
order for benign envy to arise, the envier has to feel pretty confident and hopeful that they can 
overcome their disadvantage. If they feel “hopeless” and “helpless” (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007, 
456-459), then they are likely to develop feelings of malicious envy and be motivated to “level 
down” and engage in aggressive and hostile behaviors, such as sabotaging the envied or spoiling the 
good among others. 
 Some contemporary philosophers have also developed more positive accounts of envy (La 
Caze 2001; Thomason 2015). I, too, defend the view that envy need not be bad and argue that a 
certain species of envy, what I call emulative envy, may even be virtuous in some conditions (Protasi 
2021). Emulative envy is characterized by being more concerned with the good than with the 
envied’s possession of it,3 and by a perception that leveling up to the envied is a likely possibility. In 
other words, the emulative envier is more preoccupied with the lack of a certain good than with the 
fact that another person has it. The envied’s having the good is both a reminder of the envier’s lack 
and proof that the envier could also have it (insofar as the envier and the envied are similar). 
Furthermore, the emulative envier believes that they can improve their condition and achieve the 
good on their own terms, without taking it from the envied. Thus, they are motivated to “level up” 
to the envied. 
 Recall my envy for my sister’s unblemished skin. If I feel emulative envy, that means that I 
think that I might be able to improve the state of my skin, perhaps through an appropriate skin 
regimen or nutritional plan, and that I care about this good more than the fact that it’s my sister who 
has better skin. It’s not that I have a rivalry with my sister, but rather that I really care about good 
skin and my sister’s skin shows me the possibility of achieving it.  
 
3 Focus of concern is a continuous variable. As mentioned earlier, envy always involves three parties, so the envier is 
always concerned with the envied and the good. But sometimes they are more concerned with lacking the good, whereas 
other times they are more concerned with the fact that the envied has it. Aristotle makes the same point (but in 
dichotomous terms) when distinguishing between zēlos (usually translated as ‘emulation’) and phthonos (usually translated 
as ‘envy’) in Rhetoric II, 10-11. 
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You may object that this doesn’t sound like envy. This is a reasonable concern which I 
address extensively elsewhere (Protasi 2016, and 2021, esp. 51-54). For the purposes of the present 
discussion, and given that the notion of benign envy is becoming mainstream in the empirical 
literature, I’ll just assume it. I won’t, however, assume my more controversial view that benign envy 
can be virtuous (note that my example above doesn’t qualify as virtuous, since unblemished skin is 
not clearly a component of eudaimonia and it actually sounds a bit frivolous and ableist—fortunately, 
it’s a purely hypothetical case!). 
There are three other kinds of envy that I discuss in my work. Inert envy is an ineffective 
version of emulative envy, which one feels when one is more concerned with the good than with the 
envied, but doesn’t feel capable of improving one’s situation. It’s a self-defeating emotion, which 
aims for something it cannot achieve, and doesn’t motivate anything but sulking and resignation. It’s 
not malicious, but is prudentially bad, and counterproductive. A good example would be “baby 
envy”: when someone cannot conceive a child, and they envy people who can. These enviers often 
don’t wish the envied lose their good (i.e. lose their fertility or the baby), but their envy cannot in 
typical cases lead to self-improvement. Aggressive envy is one species of what is usually called 
malicious envy. It’s more focused on the envied than the good, and it motivates bringing the envied 
down to one’s level. It’s the kind of envy that motivates stealing the good and sabotaging the envied; 
its paradigmatic example is tripping someone during a race in order to get ahead of them. It doesn’t 
achieve one’s self-improvement, but it helps to reduce the gap with the envied. This envy motivates 
morally bad behavior, but it can bring genuine advantages. Finally, another species of malicious envy 
is spiteful envy, which is the perverse cousin of aggressive envy, the one we feel when we lack all hope 
of even subtracting the good, and so it motivates us to spoil it. My usual example here is Othello’s 
villain: Iago cannot get Cassio’s promotion, or Othello’s beautiful wife. So, he proceeds to destroy 
their happiness. In a way, spiteful envy is slightly more effective than inert envy, since the envied 
does lose their advantage. But Othello aims to teach us that this advantage is short-lived (Iago will 
languish in prison for his misdeeds). Spiteful envy is thus both morally and prudentially bad.  
Importantly, all of these types can be fitting, but envy is so complex that evaluations of its 
fittingness are complex too. Many of envy’s facets consist in subjective perceptions; thus, whether 
one’s envy is fitting depends on whether those perceptions are apt. Am I right in thinking that my 
sister’s skin is smoother than mine? Perhaps I magnify my blemishes or underestimate hers. Is it the 
case that my sister is similar to me in relevant respects? Even though we’re genetically related 
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(assuming she is my biological sibling), perhaps she’s much younger, in which case a comparison to 
her may not make much sense when it comes to skin texture.4 
Now, one may ask: is it really appropriate given who I am to care so much about this? I may be 
opaque to myself, lacking self-knowledge or even deceiving myself. Upon reflection, I may realize 
that what really bothers me is something else. Perhaps I’m pained by how my parents praise my 
sister’s appearance over mine, which in turn manifests to me a disparity in love and care. If that’s the 
case, then my envy for her skin is unfitting, not because unblemished skin isn’t good—it’s unfitting 
because an unblemished skin is not relevant to my self-identity, and it’s a proxy, a trigger or a 
symptom of another sort of perceived inferiority. 5 It might also be that resentment, not envy, is the 
fitting response here, if my parents are wronging me. 
Finally, if we do accept the distinction between different kinds of envy, we might wonder 
whether one’s perception of control over the outcome (i.e., my ability to obtain the good, or to steal 
it or spoil it) is correct. Suppose I am more focused on the good (my sister’s beautiful skin) than the 
envied (my sister’s having such beautiful skin). Perhaps I’m overly confident in my capacity to 
improve an organ as capricious and voluble as the skin; or, vice versa, I’m too insecure or ignorant 
about the great improvements in skin cosmetics. Either way, whether I’m correct in my perception 
of the likelihood that I can level up to my sister will determine whether the particular kind of envy 
I’m feeling is fitting or unfitting. That is, if I’m too optimistic about my capacity to improve my skin, 
my emulative envy will be unfitting; vice versa, if I’m too insecure, my inert envy will be unfitting. 
Imagine, instead, that I’m more focused on the envied than on the good. Then, perhaps I feel 
spiteful envy and I’m confident I can switch her beauty products and damage her skin. But in fact 
beautiful skin is just in her DNA (somehow I don’t share those particular genes with her!), and so 
my spiteful envy is unfitting. (Given the envied object, aggressive envy just doesn’t seem possible. 
This isn’t a flaw in the model, but a reflection of the multifarious nature of envy and envied goods.)  
 So far, we have looked at the fittingness of the envied’s assessment of their position vis-à-vis 
the envied (whether they are actually disadvantaged; how similar they actually are); of their 
perception of self-relevance (given the envier’s overall system of values, is this particular concern 
 
4 This isn’t to say an older person cannot envy a younger person, but only that their envy might not be fitting. I’m happy 
to grant this is up for debate—much depends on what the salient similarity in the eyes of the envier is; but we can easily 
imagine someone telling the envier: “come on, it doesn’t make sense for you to envy her! She’s so much younger than 
you! You have great skin for your age!”. Thanks to Steve Campbell for pressing me on this point. 
5 Introspection can go wrong in many other ways: I might not even be aware I’m envious, or I might mistake my envy 
for resentment (a well-known phenomenon; see e.g., Parrott and Smith 1993). I set these complications aside.  
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consistent with it?); and of their perception of control over the situation (is it really the case that I 
can/cannot level up or down with the envied?). 
 But there’s another factor that determines whether my envy is fitting, one that has received 
more attention in the philosophical tradition than the ones highlighted above: is the object of envy 
really good for me and my well-being more generally, and thus truly worth pursuing? The agent sees the 
lacked object as good, but are they mistaken? If they are, their envy is unfitting. 
 For the purposes of this discussion, I assume both objectivism and pluralism about value; 
I’m not committed to a specific list, but here are some popular and not too controversial examples 
of goods: happiness (in the psychological sense, i.e., a positive balance of affective states including 
sensory pleasures), excellence, beauty, health, knowledge, (rewarding) interpersonal relationships, 
meaning, and achievement.  
Thus, I’m leaving out, for now, objects like wealth and the latest tech gadget, or a 
combination of the two, such as the Black Diamond iPhone 5—a status symbol for our times. Even 
though status symbols are often envied, many philosophers doubt that they are actually good for us, 
and I agree.  
While happiness, excellence, beauty, health, knowledge, love, meaning, and achievement may 
be considered relatively uncontroversial examples of goods, suggesting that they are fitting objects of 
envy may be met with unease, as we are going to see in the next section. 
 
2. Against Fitting Envy: Immanuel Kant 
To reiterate, there are many distinct, if often related, critiques of envy across cultures and 
philosophical traditions. Some of them derive from distrust about emotions in general (e.g., 
Stoicism), while some others are specifically concerned with envy and its alleged immorality (e.g., 
Bacon and Spinoza). Others don’t explicitly or vehemently condemn envy, and yet don’t rush to 
defend its possible fittingness either (e.g., Descartes and Hume).  
Among those concerned with envy’s viciousness, Kant deplores both the immoral actions it 
motivates and its inappropriate focus on relative positioning. In The Metaphysics of Morals, envy is 
defined as “a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, even though it doesn’t detract 
from one’s own; when it breaks forth into action (to diminish their well-being) It’s called envy 
proper; otherwise It’s merely jealousy (invidentia)” (4:458).   
 9 
Envy “proper” is denounced as a “vice of hatred” (4:458), “contrary to a man’s duty to 
himself as well as to others” (4:459). Insofar as it goes against the demands of practical reason to 
respect humanity and make other people’s happiness our end, it’s practically irrational.6 Even mere 
jealousy is arguably worrisome, given that it’s a distress at the good fortune of others even when it 
doesn’t affect us directly, and that it motivates immoral actions. 
 Since he talks about a “propensity”, Kant probably isn’t thinking about occurrent emotions, 
but rather dispositions or character traits. Nevertheless, I doubt he’d feel too sanguine about 
occurrent bouts of envy, either. Both here and elsewhere Kant is concerned with envy’s essentially 
comparative and competitive nature. I think that for him that is the fundamental problem with envy; 
therein originates its vicious nature.  
He discusses social comparison and the “malignant inclination” of envy (6:93) also in Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In that text, Kant is worried by a typically human form of self-
love, shaped by the concern for what others think of us (6:27). After an initial anxiety for being of 
equal worth to others, we gradually develop “an unnatural desire to acquire superiority for oneself 
over others” (6:27). Envy is thus both irrational and immoral, and the source of its irrationality and 
immorality ultimately lies in the process of social comparison, which wreaks havoc in man’s 
originally good nature.  
 For this reason, Kant rejects both envy and the tendency to compare oneself to others even 
with regard to pedagogy: while encouraging children to emulate their well-behaved peers might seem 
like a good practice, it ends up stirring resentment and envy. Thus, Kant recommends educators to 
cultivate in children the aspiration to duty itself (Lectures on Pedagogy 9:491-492). 
 Even if one disagrees with my interpretation of Kant, I hope one would still find this type of 
view not only intelligible, but familiar: authentic goodness is often said to be non-comparative and 
non-positional in everyday conversations.  
When children lament that their siblings or friends get to have or do something they don’t, 
parents and educators usually invite them to focus on their own situation, to think of their lot as 
independent from that of others. (My personal experience as a parent is particularly paradoxical, as I 
defend envy and the value of competition in theory, and am constantly frustrated by its effects on 
my children in practice.) 
 
6 Thanks to E. Sonny E. Elizondo for help with this formulation, and for feedback on my understanding of these texts. 
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 When adults express their envy, they often find that self-help books, meditation apps, 
psychology blogs, religious sermons, and philosophy op-eds encourage them to feel gratitude for the 
good fortune they have, on the one hand, and to avoid comparisons to others, on the 
other. According to this perspective, envy is systematically unfitting, because how we stack up 
compared to others is not truly relevant to our well-being. Being inferior to the envied is not actually 
bad, and improving one’s relative position is not actually good. 
While it’s usually acknowledged that envy, as a natural human emotion, may not be fully 
eliminated, the general advice is to avoid feeling it as much as possible, and the most effective way to 
do that is attacking it at its roots, refraining from comparison and from attributing value to one’s 
relative standing.  
 The problem with this advice is two-fold: it’s not psychologically realistic, and it’s not 
prudentially desirable. It’s not realistic because interpersonal comparison is a very powerful and basic 
mechanism that cannot be easily extirpated from our minds, and that undergirds many important 
psychological functions (I say more about this in section 4). Even if it were possible to get rid of 
interpersonal comparison, however, it wouldn’t be desirable, because our conception of goodness 
wouldn’t be recognizable without it.  
  
 
3. In Favor of Fitting Envy: Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson  
When it comes to defending envy’s fittingness, the obligatory reference is D’Arms and Jacobson’s 
seminal work on the fittingness of human sentiments (2000, 2002, 2006). I won’t review this work in 
detail, but only summarize their most persuasive argument in defense of envy’s fittingness. 
D’Arms and Jacobson (2006) consider envy the “most intuitively compelling case” (p. 106) 
for the “zealot’s” view that some emotions are systematically unfitting. They happily concede that 
envy is both ugly and painful, and claim that attempts to embellish it and defend its potentially 
benign or positive nature are either misleading or confused (ouch!). So, they argue with the “zealot” 
on their own grounds: if they can prove that even envy can be fitting, then a fortiori their view holds 
for any other human sentiment. 
Their defense of envy rests on their well-known notion of fittingness: “to think an emotion a 
fitting response to some object is to think there is (pro tanto) reason, of a distinctive sort, for feeling 
the emotion toward it” (ibid., 108). Reasons of fit are distinctive, and differ from moral and 
prudential reasons, in that they “speak directly to what one takes the emotion to be concerned with” 
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(ivi). Emotions—they argue—are evolutionarily-shaped responses to many cross-cultural concerns 
and values. Their pluralistic approach accounts for the fact that human values are often in conflict 
with one another, both within and across domains: not only is it possible to be faced with genuine 
ethical dilemmas, but also to experience tension and strife between aesthetic, interpersonal, ethical 
and epistemic considerations. 
The human concern individuated by envy is relative positioning: when we feel envy, we, at least 
sometimes, appropriately react to being disadvantaged vis-à-vis a (similar) other (with regard to a 
domain of self-importance). This concern is not only deep, that is, ingrained and hard to eradicate in 
an average human being, but also wide, that is, “firmly enmeshed in our web of psychological 
responses” (ibid., 116). Envy is concerned with positional goods, which are both ubiquitous and, contra 
Kant, important. Positional goods can be defined as “goods the absolute value of which, to their 
possessors, depends on those possessors’ place in the distribution of the good—on their relative 
standing with respect to the good in question” (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 474). If it can be shown 
that positional goods are a central and appropriate human concern, then envy is at least sometimes 
fitting. 
D’Arms and Jacobson go on to list many positional goods, starting from the most obvious 
examples, such as sports achievements, job promotions, and being at the top of social hierarchy, all 
the way to excellence itself: they argue that the very idea of excellence is inherently comparative and 
relative: “which accomplishments count as excellent, or sufficiently good to be worthy of pride, is 
largely a function of the performance of others (especially those who are nearby)” (2006, 123).  
Since relative positioning is a central and appropriate human concern, envy, as a response to 
this concern, is thus fitting. D’Arms and Jacobson, however, go on to caution against inferring that 
envy’s fittingness makes it prudentially or morally good: “perhaps morality forbids acting from envy 
or even feeling it” (ibid., 124).  
D’Arms and Jacobson’s argument doesn’t rest on equating every excellence or 
accomplishment to a zero-sum game. Some of the contexts they describe are zero-sum (i.e. sport 
races), but many others are not and yet they rely on comparison (whether one is a “strong” runner 
depends on the comparison class). Thus, I think that D’Arms and Jacobson don’t carefully 
distinguish between associated but distinct concepts: zero-sum situations, positional goods, and 
relative or comparative standards of goodness. The remainder of the paper is devoted to developing 
their argument further. First, I consider the role comparison plays in judgments about goodness; then, 




4. The Role of Comparison in Judgments of Goodness 
Let’s go back to sibling envy. When I think about the kind of envy I feel toward my imaginary 
saintly sister, I don’t have to reach too far in my imagination: I can think of sibling rivalries I 
witnessed from up close, including between my own kids. Envy in children is ubiquitous and often 
unfitting, and it’s ubiquitous for the same reason it’s often unfitting, namely because their social 
comparison skills are still developing and they don’t have a good sense of relevant comparison 
classes (so, for instance, they may get upset if a professional artist draws better than them). 
Furthermore, they have a fluid and ever-changing sense of their own identity and what matters to 
them: they haven’t yet “specialized” in one domain, like adults do when they think of themselves as 
“a dancer” or “a philosopher”. Thus, since almost everyone who outperforms them is perceived as 
similar, and because so many things matter to them, their envy is often all-encompassing and 
indiscriminating (Bers and Rodin 1984). 
But sometimes children’s comparisons are spot on, sensible, and appropriate. And this 
behavior—social psychologists tell us—is healthy and normal. Susan Fiske calls humans 
“comparison machines” (Fiske, 2011, 13) We habitually and automatically (thus often unconsciously) 
compare ourselves to others, and this mechanism is essential for a variety of psychological functions, 
including gathering information for self-assessment and self-improvement, self-esteem protection, 
and fitting into social groups (Mussweiler 2003; Fiske 2011; Corcoran et al. 2011; Mussweiler et al. 
2011).  
One might object that people can be assessed non-comparatively as well. But there are 
reasons to doubt this. D’Arms and Jacobson (2006) already present a persuasive discussion of 
various situations in which being considered a good X soon becomes a matter of being considered 
better than or worse than another person (along the relevant dimension). After reviewing domains such 
as scholarship, arts, industry, and athletics (all domains central to our flourishing) they talk of being 
the “Number One Dad”—the dad who mentors and coaches the kids in the neighborhood. 
Obviously, this is definitionally a comparative property, since it includes a ranking. But one might 
want to eschew comparisons and aim to be a “Good-Enough Dad”. 
On the one hand, the property of good-enough-daddyness may be said to be non-comparative: 
for instance, a good-enough daddy does not abuse his children and provides for their essential 
physical and emotional needs.  
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On the other hand, this is a socially-constructed notion, a type of goodness that is 
unavoidably shaped by human judgments and perceptions, which are in turn subject to historically-
situated social and cultural norms: good-enough dads 50 years ago were those who did not beat their 
children and showed up at dinner time. The criteria for crossing the “good enough” threshold, our 
judgments about what a good-enough dad is like, are much more demanding nowadays.  
The same holds for many contemporary standards of goodness. Take the arts, in the ancient 
Greek sense of technai: people run faster and longer, create more complex artworks, invent more 
impressive technology, achieve ever-greater feats of virtuosity in all domains.  
So, whether or not we are considered good children, parents, or spouses, whether we are 
decreed as excellent philosophers, computer scientists, dancers, engineers, or potters—any threshold 
that is used to evaluate success or achievement or even just mere adequacy is going to be determined 
by looking at what other individuals on average accomplish.7  
A similar point applies to assessments of physical properties such as good growth or good 
health, which all rely on some form of comparison or other. When children are evaluated for 
growth, pediatricians consult charts that are inherently, by design comparative: being a tall child 
simply means being taller than the average child. Counting as “healthy” at 70 years of age relies on 
very different indicators than at 3 or 25, and counting as healthy in a contemporary industrialized 
society looks quite different from what it did in preindustrial societies of the past, or in today’s 
hunter-gatherer societies. How to understand the notions of health and healthy systems is a 
controversial topic, but here I set aside the conceptual complications and suggest that, in practice, 
our judgments of health are unavoidably comparative.8 This point generalizes to most (all?) bodily 
and mental properties that people deem valuable, whether it’s IQ or endurance and speed, and 
applies even to judgments of properties like vertical symmetry in a face, which is well-known to be a 
crucial feature in judgments of attractiveness (Fink et al. 2006; Young et al. 2011) perhaps because 
it’s a marker of genetic health and resistance to disease (Jones et al. 2001; Young et al. 2011). 
Perceptions of facial attractiveness are shown to be biased by assimilative and contrastive biases, 
both of which depend on comparison; as Pegors et al. (2015) put it: “[t]o navigate the social world, it 
 
7 Gwen Bradford, the philosophical authority on accomplishments, also argues that difficulty and achievements are 
attributed on the basis of relevant comparison classes (Bradford 2015, 61-62). 
8 See Murphy 2020 for the complex debate on the concept of health. Elizabeth Barnes discusses both comparative 
health judgments and theories of health in a book in progress. Bloomfield 2001 defends a relativistic understanding of 
the property of healthiness. 
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is important to be able to evaluate face attractiveness, but these judgments are always made in 
relation to a larger social and environmental context.”  
 Both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest that our concern for relative positioning is 
impossible to eradicate. Our deeming something good is often ultimately a matter of deeming it to be 
better than. I’ll come back to the implications of these judgments for fitting envy, but I want first to 
examine a more direct way in which comparison is relevant to human goodness. 
 
 
5. The Role of Comparison in Goodness  
Some things cannot be good outside of a competition or ranking. The relativity here is 
metaphysically and logically necessary. This is the case of positional goods mentioned earlier. 
Positional goods are often discussed in economics, where they are sometimes framed in terms of 
“positional concerns” (Solnick and Hemenway 1998).  
 A standard example of a non-material positional good is honor, as a social status notion: to be 
honored in a certain society means to be anointed, to be given a social status that is higher than 
other people’s. It’s an “essentially hierarchical” notion as Stephen Darwall puts it (2013, 17). To be 
in any honor association is valuable because it’s selective and “rank-defining” (ibid., 18). 
Other examples of positional goods are connected to social status, and in a consumeristic 
society they are often material goods, objects or experiences that cost a lot of money and which 
many people cannot afford, and thus function as status symbols. That paradigmatic examples of 
conspicuous consumption (defined as “expenditure on or consumption of luxuries on a lavish scale in an 
attempt to enhance one’s prestige”9) are also paradigmatic examples of envy is not incidental to 
envy’s bad fame.  These tend to be dismissed as inauthentic goods not only by moral philosophers, 
but also by sociologists and psychologists, for good reasons: evidence shows that they don’t actually 
bring happiness, and one of the reasons why they don’t is that agents are caught up in an arms race, 
which is never-ending and collectively damaging (Frank 1999). But some positional goods aren’t as 
easily rejected as false idols: educational pedigrees are one such case. Ivy League degrees have value 
partly (some might say primarily!) in virtue of the social currency they carry, as shown by the success 
of many an underachieving student who can nevertheless tout having graduated from a prestigious 




very difficult to be admitted to one of those schools. Similarly with publications: the higher the 
rejection rate of a journal, the better the journal is taken to be. (We can quibble about the causal 
chain here: it’s possible that initially a journal is taken to be very good because of its editors—editors 
who often come from prestigious institutions, but never mind that—but soon enough high rejection 
rate becomes a feature of a good journal.) Variations of this mechanism can be found everywhere: a 
robust feature of human psychology is that we value being part of exclusive clubs. Groucho Marx’s 
joke that he doesn’t want to be a member of a club that admits him relies in part on this truth. 
Furthermore, many goods, whether they are themselves positional or not, have latent 
positional aspects, as argued by Brighouse and Swift (2006, 478-479). Even if healthiness is not 
positional in itself, it may be instrumental to achieving positional goods: the healthier a person is, the 
greater access they have to jobs, education, and other positional or otherwise scarce goods. Similar 
considerations apply for beauty or wits, insofar as they allow people to get ahead in the world. 
Indeed, physical attractiveness and intelligence are among the goods for which positional 
preferences are strongest: in surveys, people consistently claim to prefer lower absolute levels of 
attractiveness and intelligence for oneself and one’s kids, if that allows them to have them in 
comparatively higher amounts (Solnick and Hemenway 2005; Hillesheim and Mechtel 2015).10 
Note the difference between the claim I’m making here and the claim I made in the previous 
section. It’s not just that when we judge someone to be attractive or intelligent we are, consciously 
or unconsciously, comparing them to others in the relevant comparison class; it’s also that 
attractiveness and intelligence themselves (even if they could be measured according to absolute 
non-relational standards) are positional and have indirect positional aspects.  
This is not to say that all goods are positional, directly or latently. Take such sensorial 
pleasures and simple joys as hearing birds tweet and children laugh on a sunny Winter morning; the 
warmth and sounds and color of an autumnal fire; an unexpected caress by a usually reserved lover, 
or the smile of a stranger. These experiences are arguably good, and even components of our 
flourishing, and yet don’t depend on comparison, hierarchy, or competition. And there are other 
goods and components of our well-being like this, including perhaps knowledge and meaning.  
My aim in this and the previous section was to show that positional goods and goods with 
latent positional aspects are numerous and important, and that, furthermore, most of our judgments 
 
10 Interestingly, in these surveys people rush to note that “their positional choices were not motivated primarily by envy. 
Many seemed to see life as an ongoing competition, in which not being ahead means falling behind.” (Solnick and 
Hemenway, 379). Setting aside the fact that people aren’t always aware of their envy, or eager to admit it, not being 
primarily motivated by envy is compatible with their envy being fitting. 
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of goodness are comparative. Thus, not only envy can be fitting, but it can be fitting in many more 
situations than previously highlighted, even by advocates of envy’s fittingness such as D’Arms and 
Jacobson. 
In response, one might argue that our judgments of goodness are systematically disconnected 
from actual goodness—that we’re just wrong when we deem something to be good based on its 
being better than. Relatedly, one might argue that positional goods are inauthentic goods, false idols: 
even if humans do care about relative positioning, they shouldn’t.  If that were true, then Kant 
would be right: envy is never fitting. We should not be pained by inferiority to a similar other with 
regard to a self-important domain. 
In the end, this debate boils down to conflicting intuitions about value and the relation it 
bears to human psychological propensities. I agree with the view that Martha Nussbaum attributes 
to Aristotle: “What we find valuable depends essentially on what we need and how we are limited. 
The goodness and beauty of human value cannot be comprehended or seen apart from that 
context.” (Nussbaum 1986/2001, 342) I hope to have shed light on the extent to which comparison 
and relative positioning affect both goodness and judgments of goodness, which in turn suggests 
that a conception of human goodness that is entirely noncomparative and nonpositional is 
unrecognizable as such. 
6. The Multifaceted Value of Fitting Envy 
To sum up: I have defended a metaphysical claim—that much human goodness is shaped by 
positionality—and an epistemic one—that we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what 
position we occupy in this continuum of goodness. Envy’s preoccupation with one’s relative 
positioning is fitting, insofar as it recognizes fundamental components of our subjective well-being 
and flourishing. 
 So far, I have expanded D’Arms and Jacobson’s view on the centrality of relative positioning 
in our conception of goodness and value. Now, I argue that fitting envy can be also epistemically, 
prudentially, and morally valuable, which is something that Justin D’Arms, especially, is skeptical 
about (see D’Arms 2017, and my critique in Protasi 2021, 52-54). 
Psychologists often talk about the importance of envy’s signaling value. Envy tells us, on the 
one hand, what we perceive we lack, and, on the other, what we desire and care about.11 However, 
unfitting envy sends a distorted signal, while fitting envy sends an accurate one: it informs a (self-
 
11 Exline and Zell (2008) claim also, more controversially, that envy signals alienation or disconnection.  
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aware) envier about important things that concern them. Recall my initial example but tweak it a bit: 
imagine that I envy my sibling for their ability to forgive a narcissistic parent. If my envy is fitting, it 
tells me that I perceive myself as less generous and compassionate than someone who is similar to 
me in a self-relevant domain, and that this ability I lack is authentically good. 
 Thus, fitting envy has epistemic value for the individual. (It also has epistemic value for the 
species: after all, we have just spent some time thinking about what envy tells us about human 
goodness.) 
But note also something else: my envy—let’s assume—is emulative. I really care about being 
the type of child who can forgive parental narcissism, and I’m pained by the comparison with my 
sibling only because they and I are similar. If they can forgive our parent, why can’t I? That is, I’m 
more focused on the good than the envied, who is a benchmark, showing me what I could achieve. 
Secondly, I happen to feel confident that I can become like them: I saw them go through years of 
therapy. It was not just a matter of genetic luck: they work hard on their relationship with our 
parent. I realize I can do that too. 
Thus, I’m motivated to improve myself, to emulate my sibling. My envy here is neither 
counterproductive nor misguided—on the contrary, it focuses on relative positioning with regard to 
valuable moral goods and it motivates morally appropriate behavior. If I were to “level up” with my 
sibling, becoming capable of forgiveness and understanding, my well-being would increase, and I 
would be a better person. Fitting envy can thus be morally and prudentially valuable. 
So, when envy is fitting and emulative, it motivates us to achieve objectively good things 
within our reach; it pushes us to improve ourselves and aspire to excellence. Fitting emulative envy, 
far from being a vice that ought to be repressed, plays a central role in our flourishing. 
But even other varieties of envy have partial value: they all provide information about 
ourselves, our perception of how we compare to others, of what we value, and so forth. Even the 
most spiteful envy can be diagnostic, if we’re willing to look inside ourselves: how have we got to 
the point of wishing ill will to others? What are we disposed to do when in the grip of this ugly 
emotion? Obviously, any emotion, no matter how vile, can be informative. But if envy is 
systematically connected to our flourishing, because it concerns things we genuinely and centrally 
acre about, perhaps its informational value is more precious than that of other fitting attitudes, such 
as humor. 
Furthermore, fitting aggressive envy has some prudential value, even if it’s immoral. 
Sometimes stealing the good is an effective way of increasing personal well-being, and we should be 
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aware of this, especially if we want to prevent aggressive envy’s harmful effects. Again, envy 
connects us to goodness in a peculiar way. Its affectively aversive nature makes it more motivating 
than pleasant emotions (Vaish et al. 2008), so we should acknowledge its power and value, even 
when we ultimately think that moral considerations defeat all the others. This is particularly 
important when thinking about emotions at the species level, as sometimes what is good for the 
individual conflicts with what is good for the species.  
In Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective (1784) Kant presents a thesis that 
starkly contrast with his claims about envy in other works. There, he suggests that antisocial 
passions, including envious competitiveness, can help to develop humanity’s full potential. He 
compares human beings who accept the hardship of a civic union to trees, which “precisely by 
seeking to take air and light from all the others around them, compel each other to look for air and 
light above themselves and thus grow up straight and beautiful, while those that live apart from 
others and sprout their branches freely grow stunted, crooked, and bent.” (8:22, Kant 2006, 8). In a 
civic union, individuals are bound by norms that limit their aggressive tendencies and that allow 
them to compete in a regulated manner, in a way that allows humankind to develop culture and art. 
Without the “unsociable” tendencies that drive humans to compete and fight with each other, they 
would remain in an Arcadian state of contentment and mutual affection that would, however, leave 
them passive, slothful, and “as good-natured as the sheep that they put out to pasture,” (8:21, Kant 
2006, 7), their excellent natural capacities forever dormant.  
 In this essay, Kant concedes that envy and competitive tendencies push us toward the good, 
toward developing our potential as humans. While it is possible that sometimes fitting envy should 
not be felt, expressed or acted upon, because of countervailing reasons against it, and while some 
individuals might be better served by their envious tendencies than others, for all sorts of contextual 
and idiosyncratic reasons, envy offers to all humans the possibility of being attuned to distinctively 
human goodness, and the push to excel in domains they care about. This is such a fundamental 
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